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 Abstract 
What explains contemporary intra-party dissent on EU issues? This article develops a 
cleavage theory model of internal party dissent over European integration. Drawing on Lipset 
and Rokkan’s classic model of political cleavages and on its applications to party positioning 
on European integration, I argue that if one seeks to understand when, where, and to what 
extent internal divisions manifest themselves, one must look to the particular historical 
vulnerabilities of political parties. Using expert survey data, I demonstrate that the ease with 
which political parties are able to assimilate the issue of European integration is influenced 
by the legacy of past political tensions and the extent to which the economic and political 
aspects of the EU reactivate pre-existing cleavages. 
Zusammenfassung 
Was erklärt den gegenwärtigen innerparteilichen Dissens in Europafragen? Dieser Beitrag 
entwickelt, auf der Grundlage der Theorie politischer Konfliktlinien, ein Modell zum 
innerparteilichen Dissens über Fragen der europäischen Integration. Mit Bezug auf das 
klassische Modell politischer Konfliktlinien von Lipset und Rokkan und seine Anwendung auf 
die Entstehung von Parteipositionen zur europäischen Integration illustriere ich, dass ein 
Verständnis davon, wann und in welchem Ausmaß interne Konflikte auftreten, nur durch die 
Analyse der spezifischen historischen "Verwundbarkeit" einer politischen Partei begründet 
werden kann. Ich zeige anhand von Experteneinschätzungen, dass das Potenzial politischer 
Parteien, Aspekte der europäischen Integration in ihre übergreifende programmatische 
Ausrichtung aufzunehmen, von den Hinterlassenschaften vormaliger politischer 
Spannungsverhältnisse und dem Grad abhängt, mit dem die EU bereits früher bedeutsame 
politische Konfliktlinien neu betonen. 
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Introduction 
May 29, 2005, marked the rejection by French voters of the European Constitutional Treaty, 
but December 1, 2004, will not soon be forgotten by France’s Parti Socialiste (PS). Hoping to 
quell intra-party dissent over the controversial European document, Socialist leaders staged 
an internal referendum among party members to determine the official party stance. Fifty-
nine percent voted to endorse the Treaty, but this failed to subdue party infighting. Rather 
the reverse. Former Prime Minister Laurent Fabius and his socialist allies continued to reject 
the Treaty, and their support within the party appeared to grow as the day of reckoning 
approached. The power struggle not only created uncertainty and unease for party 
supporters on the issue of European integration, leaving them without a clear signal as they 
stepped into the ballot box the following May, but it also reignited a long-standing debate 
about the party’s core ideology (Ivaldi 2006).  
Was this schism to be expected? The line of reasoning presented in this article suggests 
yes. While division over European integration in France has traditionally been the domain of 
Gaullist parties on the right of the political spectrum, I argue that the historical 
predispositions of the PS (and of socialist parties, more generally) made internal party 
dissent a likely outcome.  
This article develops a cleavage theory model of intra-party dissent over European 
integration. Drawing on Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan’s (1967) classic model of 
political cleavages, I argue that if one seeks to understand when, where, and to what extent 
internal divisions manifest themselves, one must look to the particular vulnerabilities of 
parties, which are primarily shaped by their historical experiences. As Marks and Wilson 
(2000) show, political cleavages provide a key for explaining how parties respond to issues 
of European integration. I extend this argument to intra-party dissent, contending that 
present-day rifts within political parties are not sui generis but reflect durable and deep-
seated tensions. 
In the next section I set out a theory of intra-party dissent. I then apply this theory to 
generate expectations about variation in dissent among and within party families. Finally, I 
test my hypotheses against data from expert surveys of political parties across fourteen 
Western European member states of the European Union (EU).
1
                                                       
1 The analysis stops in 2002 and therefore includes only Western European member states (i.e. the previous EU-15, 
minus Luxembourg for which expert survey data is not available). 4 — Erica E. Edwards / Products of Their Past? — I H S 
1. A Cleavage Theory of Intra-Party Dissent 
Which political parties are most vulnerable to internal dissent over European issues? My 
point of theoretical departure is an historical institutional perspective, which posits that rifts 
within political parties can be explained as expressions of prior, often deeply rooted, 
tensions. The model draws on Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) theory of social cleavages (also 
see Zuckerman 1982; Kriesi 1998). In their influential 1967 article, the authors link the 
configuration of European parties to social and cultural divisions that existed when party 
systems were established in the second half of the nineteenth century. They contend that the 
historical conflicts arising in successive critical junctures, namely the national revolution, the 
Protestant Reformation, and the industrial revolution, gave rise to enduring societal divisions 
that continue to shape identities, social institutions, and patterns of political contestation. 
Few scholars today accept the notion that party competition is frozen along the lines 
described by Lipset and Rokkan (1967); nevertheless, class, religious, and centre/periphery 
cleavages remain important in framing how political parties respond to new issues (Sartori 
1969; Dalton et al. 1984; Bartolini and Mair 1990; Kitschelt 1997; Mair 1997). This makes 
sense from an institutionalist point of view (Hall and Taylor 1996; Thelen 1999): 
organisations filter new issues through existing mental frames. Political parties are 
organisations with embedded ideologies and long-standing programs that engender intense 
loyalty on the part of leaders and activists (Budge et al. 1987). Given the high cost of 
abandoning constituency ties and programmatic commitments, political parties cannot 
reinvent themselves with each new challenge or electoral cycle. That is to say, ‘a political 
party has its own “bounded rationality” that shapes the way in which it comes to terms with 
new challenges and uncertainties’ (Marks and Wilson 2000: 434). 
While the logic of embedded cleavages and commitments may be generalized across a 
range of issues, the character of European integration – and especially the dual nature of 
contemporary European integration – makes this a particularly interesting area of 
exploration. The European project simultaneously entails economic and political integration. 
From its origins in the 1950s, the creation of Europe has been an economic venture, 
involving the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers, the creation of a single market, and the 
establishment of a monetary union and a common currency. However, European integration 
is also a political project, involving the transfer of authority from national actors to 
subnational and supranational actors as EU decision-making infiltrates new policy areas 
(including environmental, social, and foreign and security) and engages new sets of actors 
(including interest groups, social movements, political parties, and citizens). This qualitative 
and quantitative shift in the nature of the EU has gone hand-in-hand with heightened public 
contestation and increased politicisation of the integration process by political elites (Hooghe 
and Marks 2009; also see Marks and Steenbergen 2004).  
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Lipset and Rokkan’s cleavage theory has been adapted to explain how political parties 
respond to these two components of European integration (Hix and Lord 1997; Hix 1999; 
Marks and Wilson 2000; Marks et al. 2002; Kriesi et al. 2006). The present article deepens 
and extends this line of reasoning. I suggest that divisions over European integration are not 
new schisms. Rather, they are expressions of entrenched tensions within party families and 
within individual parties that reflect historical cleavages activated by European issues. In 
other words, the ability of political parties to assimilate the issue of European integration is 
influenced by the legacy of past political tensions and specifically by the extent to which the 
nature of the EU (e.g. as a market for authoritative regulation) reactivates these pre-existing 
conflicts.
2  
This model leads one to expect levels of intra-party dissent over European integration to vary 
among party families, but cleavage theory also hints at the possibility of variation within party 
families. Lipset and Rokkan’s theory highlights that the effect of a particular cleavage is often 
mediated by its interaction with prior societal cleavages and by ‘different conditions of 
national politics and socioeconomic development’ (1967: 114). Societal cleavages do not 
translate mechanically into constellations of political parties: ‘there are considerations of 
organisational and electoral strategy; there is the weighing of payoffs of alliances against 
losses through split-offs; and there is the successive narrowing of the “mobilisation market” 
through the time sequences of organisational efforts’ (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 141). The 
result is marked geographical variation in party systems and, as I argue below, parallel 
variation within and among party families. 
                                                       
2 Along a similar vein, Kriesi et al. (2006: 927) suggest an intensification of political conflicts within mainstream 
parties as they adjust their ideological positions to accommodate or “embed” European integration into the existing 
two-dimensional political space (defined by the authors as socio-economic and cultural). 6 — Erica E. Edwards / Products of Their Past? — I H S 
2. Hypothesizing Variation Among and Within Party Families 
The previous paragraphs apply cleavage theory to intra-party dissent over European 
integration  in general. Below, I offer more specific expectations concerning variation in 
internal party dissent both among and within party families (see Table 1 for a summary). 
Class Cleavage 
The double-barrelled nature of European integration generates friction for parties competing 
on either side of the class cleavage (Hix 1999; Hooghe and Marks 1999; Ladrech 1993; Hix 
and Lord 1997). Emerging out of the industrial revolution and the conflict between blue-collar 
workers and owners of capital, the social democratic party family sits on the left side of the 
class cleavage. These parties tend to favour social equality and generous welfare spending 
and are rooted in the belief that ‘the economy must be brought under control through an 
interventionalist state’ (Padgett and Paterson 1991: 49). 
The European project pulls social democratic parties in opposing directions (Featherstone 
1988; Ladrech 1997, 2000; Ladrech and Marlière 1999), challenging their economic ideals 
and setting the stage for dissent. On the negative side, economic integration jeopardizes 
nation-wide socialist achievements ‘by intensifying international economic competition and 
undermining Keynesian responses to it’ (Marks and Wilson 2000: 437). Increased capital 
mobility, pressure for greater labour flexibility, and heightened labour substitutability across 
countries – all consequences of deeper market integration – diminish the bargaining power 
of labour and increase that of employers. On the positive side, European political integration 
offers the possibility of continental regulation in an era when national regulation has 
seemingly lost its effectiveness.
3  
Given this tension, the potential for conflict remains high, especially for social democratic 
parties in countries with generous welfare states and powerfully organized labour. European 
integration is a political hazard in strong social democratic contexts, e.g. in Scandinavia, 
where national achievements are beyond replication at the European level. In such 
environments, social democrats fear that European integration will dilute redistribution and 
diminish the capacity of labour to bargain effectively.
4  
                                                       
3 The unmitigated failure of French President François Mitterrand’s attempt at ‘socialism in one country’ in the early 
1980s provided an important wake-up call, signalling that economic and political isolation from the European 
organisation was largely untenable. Since then, most social democrats have embraced the virtues of European 
integration, advocating a project of regulated capitalism to rival the more neoliberal and nationalist projects put forth 
by other party families (see Marks and Wilson 2000: 442-8).  
4 This argument is similar to that of Kriesi et al. (2006) who distinguish between a ‘classical left’, which opposes 
economic liberalism and open borders because they threaten left achievements at the national level, and a 
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On the right side of the political spectrum, conservative parties are confronted with a similar 
rationale running in the opposite direction. For these more neoliberal parties, the European 
economic project has the benefit of constraining the economic intervention of national 
governments. The transaction costs of shifting investment across countries are minimized, 
inducing national governments to compete in attracting capital to their countries. The threat 
of political integration, however, looms large for these parties. Left unchecked, political 
integration runs the risk of developing a supranational government at the EU level capable of 
regulating markets. 
The conservative party family is particularly susceptible to internal strife over European 
integration because of the long-standing tension between the neoliberal tradition, supporting 
free markets and minimal state intervention, and the national tradition, rejecting the 
importance of class to political issues (e.g. Baker et al. 1993, 1994; Alexandre and Jardin 
1997; Flood 1997; Marks and Wilson 2000: 454-8; Hooghe et al. 2004: 235-7; Hooghe and 
Marks 2009: 17). The double nature of European integration touches directly upon this pre-
existing fissure. For neoliberals, the European project of economic integration is largely an 
extension of their fundamental political-economic ideals, leading them to favour the venture 
to the extent that it improves regime competition and leads to a more integrated market. 
Though they believe that the focus of European integration should be economic, neoliberals 
acknowledge that some supranational political structures may be needed to realize the goal 
of market integration and are therefore willing to cede a degree of national autonomy if it 
leads to enhanced economic integration. This stands in stark opposition to nationalists who 
reject any dilution of national control. As defenders of national culture, language, community, 
and above all national sovereignty, nationalists are hostile to European integration in any 
form. The endemic tension between neoliberals and nationalists leads to the expectation that 
conservative parties will be particularly vulnerable to infighting over European integration. 
Moreover, variation among these parties will reflect the relative strength of the two opposing 
strands of conservatism. 
In contrast, situated on the extreme left of the class cleavage, radical left parties of a 
communist bent should have little problem assimilating European integration, as they tend 
to reject the EU on both economic and political grounds. For these parties, European 
integration is not only an anathema to their extreme left goals (e.g. public control over capital 
flows, heavy national investment in industrial policy, statutory employment, etc.), but it is 
viewed as fundamentally undemocratic and controlled by capitalist interests (Christensen 
1996; Hooghe et al. 2004). In its party manifesto for the 2004 European elections, for 
example, the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) called for ‘deliverance from the bonds of the 
EU’ (i.e. withdrawal from the EU), claiming that the European endeavour is nothing more 
                                                                                                                                                      
‘modernised left’, which embraces globalisation and tries to reconcile endorsements of neoliberal free trade with 
concerns for social justice. Also see Kriesi (2007: 86-7) and Giddens (1998). 8 — Erica E. Edwards / Products of Their Past? — I H S 
than an alliance created ‘to enhance big capital’s share of the international capitalist market’ 
and that the Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Nice as well as the European 
Constitution ‘deliver the coup de grace to popular rights and to democracy.’
5 Since they are 
inclined to oppose the European project on both economic and political fronts, my 
expectation is that communist radical left parties will exhibit relatively low levels of internal 
dissent on EU issues. 
It is important to note, however, that this expectation does not hold for the entire radical left 
party family. As we will see below, the emergence of a new politics cleavage across Europe 
has spurred the development of a second variant of radical left parties – the so-called ‘new 
left’. While these parties tend to share the communists’ views on the economic evils of the 
EU, they have adopted a more positive line on the political dimension. Thus, while 
communist parties should be unified, the opposite should be true for new left parties. 
Church-State Cleavage 
Originating in the Protestant Reformation, which pitted the Catholic Church against state- 
and nation-building elites, the church-state cleavage characterizes the second set of party 
families. Christian democratic parties correspond to the Catholic side of this cleavage. This 
party family has been among the most supportive of the EU project, as European integration 
coincides with the supranational aspirations of the Catholic Church. The anti-national bias of 
Catholic parties that arose from the historic battles with national state-builders feeds this 
affinity on the political side, while their practical desire for economic prosperity contributes to 
their support of international economic integration.
6 Consequently, I hypothesize that 
Christian democratic parties will display high levels of internal party unity over European 
integration. 
Unlike their Catholic counterparts, however, Protestant parties should be marred with intra-
party dissent. These political parties have been profoundly fashioned by the distinctive 
layering and intermingling of the church-state and centre-periphery cleavages characteristic 
of Scandinavia (Valen and Rokkan 1974). Rooted in revivalist Lutheran fundamentalism, 
which grew out of opposition to the dominance of government elites and mainstream 
Lutheranism, these parties share none of the supranational proclivities of their Christian 
democratic counterparts and often exhibit a distinctly nationalist flavour. Though favouring 
economic integration at the European level because of its tendency to dampen the role of 
                                                       
5 KKE manifesto, 2004 European Elections,  
http://inter.kke.gr/AboutGreece/elections/eu-election/2004eu-election/2004-euelection-statement/  
(accessed 23 July 2007). 
6 Although Christian democratic parties differ from market oriented conservative parties in their support for relatively 
generous welfare programmes, neither set of parties doubts the benefits of economic neoliberalism. 
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the state in the economy, the religiosity and opposition to central authority of Protestant 
parties leads them to vehemently oppose political integration (Karvonen 1994; Madeley 
2004). Hence, I anticipate high levels of internal party dissent. 
Centre-Periphery Cleavage 
The centre-periphery cleavage emerged out of the national revolutions of the nineteenth 
century. The establishment of nation-states set administrative centres against peripheral, 
locally entrenched elites and resulted in ethnic and regionalist centre-periphery conflicts. In 
countries such as Britain, France, and Spain, with strong central states, this cleavage 
ultimately led to the suppression of strong territorially concentrated regional minorities (such 
as the Catalans, the Basque, the Scots, and the Welsh) and spurred the creation of regional 
political parties to defend such interests. In the more decentralized Protestant countries of 
Scandinavia, peripheral minorities remained territorially dispersed, resulting in emergence of 
strong agrarian  parties protecting the interests of farmers and Lutheran fundamentalists 
(Marks and Wilson 2000: 438-9). 
I expect regionalist parties to be fairly united in favour of European integration (Jolly 2007). 
European integration transforms the political setting in which these parties operate. To begin, 
because European integration modifies the notion of political sovereignty, the age-old 
adversary of peripheral nationalism – the state – has changed in nature. On the one hand, 
the regionalists’ enemy has been weakened, as the nation-state’s competencies and 
authority have markedly diminished. On the other hand, as Alan Milward (1992) suggests, 
European integration can also be seen as a lifeboat for nation-states (particularly for smaller 
nation-states), assuring their physical and economic security and thereby providing a 
mechanism for their survival (see Alesina and Spoaore 2003). Seen from the perspective of 
regionalist parties, the latter is a potential opportunity. The notion of ‘independence within 
Europe’ becomes a more viable option since the wider EU context diminishes economic and 
military costs.
7 More specifically, in economic terms regionalist parties stand to gain from the 
European project because it provides an expanded and more readily accessible venue within 
which regional firms can participate, not to mention the substantial economic support the EU 
grants to Europe’s poorest areas through its cohesion policies. Politically, European 
integration offers greater regional autonomy and representation and provides a more 
hospitable setting for ethno-territorial minorities than that provided within their national 
borders.  
                                                       
7 Jolly (2007) quantitatively demonstrates the power of the viability argument in explaining EU support among 
regionalist parties. These findings are backed up by a case study of the Scottish National Party (SNP) in which the 
author shows that ‘independence in Europe’ (i.e. viability) was decisive in the party’s decision to begin endorsing 
European integration in the mid-1980s. Also see Sillars (1986) and De Winter and Cachafeiro (2002: 488). 10 — Erica E. Edwards / Products of Their Past? — I H S 
Though sharing similar centre-periphery origins, the agrarian party family should possess 
few of the regionalist’s tendencies for internal party cohesion since its moderately favourable 
position on economic integration is at odds with its decidedly negative stance towards 
political integration. Historically, agrarian (or centre) parties have represented rural areas 
and, similar to Protestant parties, bear the influences of the particular pattern of social 
cleavages characteristic of Scandinavia – namely the mingling of the church-state and 
centre-periphery cleavages with a third urban-rural divide. The degree to which these parties 
maintain their links to agrarian interests varies (Arter 2001), but their common rural heritage 
combined with the weakness of feudalism and the absence of the strong centralizing hand of 
the Catholic Church at the time of their inception remain influential. Agrarian parties view 
themselves as “champions of the rural periphery” and therefore are inclined to resist all 
movements toward centralisation of authority, which benefit urban centres to the detriment of 
local interests and undermine national identity, regardless of whether such movements occur 
at the national or supranational level (Sundberg 1999; Lindström and Wörlund 1988). 
Moreover, politically motivated territorial politics has tended to encompass protection of 
values and culture. As Batory and Sitter note: ‘given the tendency to portray the countryside 
as the source of “authentic” national identity in contrast to the cosmopolitan (and more multi-
ethnic) cities, some agrarian parties are prone to define membership in the nation in ethnic 
(based on identity/culture) rather than civic (base on citizenship) terms (Smith 1986)’ (2004: 
529). Consequently, similar to national conservative parties, agrarians oppose political 
integration because the EU is alien and disruptive to their own national cultural milieu (Urwin 
1980).  
Economically, however, agrarian parties are more positive. Though they tend to view 
European integration as promoting industrial and commercial interests to their disadvantage, 
they find the agricultural subsidies of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) appealing. 
Additionally, while the EU’s rules on competition from foreign goods and investment as well 
as on the allowances of national subsidies hurt farmers in some countries, they are 
potentially beneficial for agrarians elsewhere. The Swedish Centre Party’s shift in position 
toward European integration in the 1990s, for example, was supported by the Federation of 
Swedish Farmers (LRF), who identified the economic benefits of EU membership to Swedish 
farmers. Denmark provides a similar story in which agrarians focus more on the economic 
benefits of membership than the threat of foreign competition (Batory and Sitter 2004: 532).  
Finally, though included in this section, the liberal party family is actually rooted in three 
cleavages – the urban-rural (in England and Germany), the church-state (in the Low 
Countries, France, Italy, and Spain), and the centre-periphery (in the Nordic countries, 
Wales, and Scotland). Unsurprisingly given its diverse origins, this party family is the most 
ideologically heterogeneous of the families and is only broadly united by its opposition to 
ascription, clericalism, and aristocracy and by its support for economic and political 
freedoms. Though liberal parties of all stripes tend to favour greater economic freedoms and 
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are accordingly inclined to support economic integration, their backing of political integration 
varies cross-nationally.  
Liberal parties can be divided into two varieties, both of which I expect to be fairly united over 
EU issues (Smith 1988; von Beyme 1985).
8 On the one hand, political or radical liberals 
(such as the Danish Radikale Venstre and the Dutch D66) are left-leaning on economic 
issues and support a broad interpretation of democratic rights. Rejecting nationalism, these 
parties seek to minimize the constraints that national borders exert over the lives of 
individuals. On the other hand, economic or conservative liberals (such as the Dutch 
Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie and the Belgian liberal parties) are right-leaning and 
stress greater economic freedom. These parties advance European integration as a means 
to lower trade barriers and to institutionalise free markets, i.e. they support negative 
integration with respect to the economy but reject the notion of Fortress Europe and oppose 
the social democratic project for regulated capitalism at the European level (Marks and 
Wilson 2000: 449). Thus, although economic liberal parties favour European integration on 
economic grounds, they oppose political integration. I therefore hypothesize that these 
parties will be slightly more divided over European integration than their politically liberal 
counterparts. 
New Politics Cleavage 
The final three party families –radical right, green, and radical left (of the new left variety) – 
have grown out of the broad, so-called ‘new politics’ or ‘new values’ cleavage.
9 Though its 
effect on the political space did not emerge until the late 1960s, the roots of this dimension 
lie in the post World War II era when the structuring capacity of the traditional cleavages 
described above began to dwindle as a result of secularisation, serialisation, value shifts, 
rising education levels, and increases in standards of living (Dalton et al. 1984; Franklin et al. 
1992). In general, this cleavage contrasts old politics values – public order, national security, 
and traditional life styles – with new politics values – individual choice, participatory 
democracy, and environmental protection. European integration, with its close link to issues 
of national sovereignty and to the new political and cultural forms of competition connected 
with globalisation, is intimately associated with this new politics cleavage (Kriesi et al. 2006: 
924).  
                                                       
8 Some identify agrarians as a third variant of liberal parties (see Weßels 1995; Hix and Lord 1997); however, their 
distinctiveness leads me to include them in a separate party family (see Lipset and Rokkan 1967).  
9 This dimension takes on many guises in the literature: post-materialist/materialist (Inglehart 1990); new politics/old 
politics (Franklin 1992; Müller-Rommel 1989); left-libertarian/right-authoritarian (Kitschelt 1994); gal (green, 
alternative, left)/tan (traditional, authoritarian, national) (Hooghe et al. 2004). 12 — Erica E. Edwards / Products of Their Past? — I H S 
By far the most Eurosceptic party family, radical right parties should be relatively internally 
cohesive with regard to European integration, although their ambiguity concerning 
economics does open the door to mild dissent (Fieschi et al. 1996; Hooghe et al. 2004; De 
Vries and Edwards 2009).
10 Their internal unity stems from 1) the location of these parties 
decidedly at the right-authoritarian or tan (traditional, authoritarian, national) end of the new 
politics dimension and 2) the prominence of this dimension over the traditional economic 
left/right axis for these parties. Academics continue to debate the origin of the radical right as 
either a challenge to the new left on non-economic issues (e.g. nationalism and law and 
order) or as a response to economic insecurities and loss of confidence in governing parties 
(Ignazi 1992; Harris 1994; Kitschelt and McGann 1997; Flanagan 1987; Cole 2005), but the 
party family’s ideological emphasis on nationalism, anti-immigration, traditionalism, and 
respect for authority is undisputed. Campaign slogans such as ‘the Netherlands is full’ (List 
Pim Fortuyn), ‘Denmark for the Danes’ (Dansk Folkeparti), ‘in charge of our own country’ 
(Vlaams Blok) as well as calls for an end to Überfremdung (over-foreignisation) and 
publications like Jean-Marie Le Pen’s Les Français d’abord (The French First) illustrate the 
core sentiments of the radical right. With regard to Europe, scholars are quick to point out 
that their negative position (especially towards political integration) is simply an extension of 
radical right parties’ core domestic platforms (Fieschi et al. 1996; Hooghe et al. 2004: 134). 
In the words of Le Pen: ‘My European programme is a faithful extrapolation from the national 
programs of the National Front, since the same dangers which threaten France threaten 
Europe’ (as quoted in Fieschi et al. 1996: 239-40). 
Economic issues tend to be less salient but are hardly irrelevant (Poguntke 1993), and it is in 
this sphere that the stirrings of dissent concerning European integration arise. Attempting to 
formulate a more attractive platform and appeal to their declining middle class followers and 
to unskilled workers, a subset of far right parties has adopted elements of economic 
neoliberalism (Betz 1993; Kitschelt and McGann 1997). The Dansk Folkeparti, the 
Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ), and the Vlaams Blok support free trade and the single 
market, while others such as the France’s FN and the Italian Allianza Nationale (AN) remain 
more sceptical (Hooghe et al. 2004: 133). This economic aspect, however, has never been 
central, and as Kitschelt notes the tendency to embrace neoliberalism has declined as 
radical right parties have increasingly taken a more nationalistic and ethnocentric line 
(Kitschelt 2001: 435; Kriesi et al. 2006). The extreme right’s ambivalent position on economic 
integration combined with its adamant rejection of political integration yields tension, leading 
one to expect moderate dissent over the EU issue.  
                                                       
10 Note that I am not discounting friction concerning the political dimension of European integration. Parties such as 
the German Republikaner and the French FN faced difficulties in the 1970-80s reconciling a supposed commitment 
to protecting European values and civilization against any external (i.e. non-European) threat with their strident 
opposition to any loss of national sovereignty. This tension appears to have dissipated with the Maastricht Treaty, as 
radical right parties dropped any notion of ‘European patriotism’ and wholeheartedly denounced the Treaty (see 
Fieschi et al. 1996).  
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The green party family, with ideological roots in the new social movements of the 1960s and 
1970s and in the environmental critique of modern industrial society, sits firmly on the left-
libertarian or gal (green, alternative, libertarian) end of the new politics spectrum. I expect 
green parties to be somewhat divided over the issue, as it rekindles pre-existing divisions. As 
Hooghe and Marks note: ‘For left-gal parties, the European Union remains a difficult 
proposition because it combines gal policies with market liberalism’ (2009: 17). On the one 
hand, essential values of the green movement, e.g. environmental sustainability, social 
justice, and global security, necessitate transnational or international coordination. Thus, the 
rhetoric of green parties suggests support for the ‘uniting of the peoples’ of Europe and the 
erasure of borders to the extent that such action facilitates solutions to transnational 
problems and diminishes nationalist sentiments. On the other hand, paramount to green 
values is a sharp critique of advanced industrial society and the environmental, social, and 
human costs that accompany economic and technological advancement. Clearly, the EU’s 
focus on market principles, economic growth, and free trade does not sit well with this core 
green criticism.  
Moreover, European integration revives the traditional strategic division between ‘realists’ 
(favouring pragmatic efforts to gain and hold power) and ‘fundamentalists’ (favouring strict 
adherence to ideology) (Doherty 1992; Burchell 2001; also see Poguntke 1989; Kitschelt 
1988). To a large extent this debate has been resolved since even contemporary activists 
are likely to concede the utility of parliamentary representation in achieving green objectives 
(Doherty 2002; Carter 2001; Bomberg and Carter 2006: S99); nevertheless, its legacy 
persists and is brought into sharp relief in the context of European integration. The theory of 
political organisation espoused by green parties – entailing direct democracy, 
decentralisation, local influence, and diffusion of power (Burchell 2001; Verdung 1989; Kemp 
and Wall 1990; Hainsworth 1990) – is at odds with the EU’s remoteness, structural hierarchy, 
and secretive decision-making. How can green fundamentalists, pioneers of the ‘anti-party’ 
party model of grass-roots democracy, accept the apparent ‘mellowing’ of green ideology that 
seems necessary to participate in the European project (Bomberg and Carter 2006)?  
Importantly, the revived realists/fundamentalists debate is not reserved for organisational 
matters but carries over into discussions about party programs. The cost of “playing the EU 
game” seems to be increased de-radicalisation, as evidenced by acceptance by some green 
parties of monetary union, emissions trading, and more recently the Constitutional Treaty
11 
as well as by the growing number of green campaigns focusing on “safer” issues (i.e. 
reforming EU democracy and accountability) to the neglect of more vital green matters (i.e. 
the environmental consequences of economic growth or security) (Bomberg 2002: 36, 44). 
                                                       
11 Crum suggests that support for Constitutional Treaty by the majority of green parties (most of whom opposed 
previous EU Treaties) may signal a trend toward green parties ‘shedding their anti-establishment views and merging 
into the political mainstream’ (2007: 74). 14 — Erica E. Edwards / Products of Their Past? — I H S 
Many green fundamentalists and grass-root activists have challenged such movements. 
Divisions within Germany’s Die Grünen, for example, came to light when Joschka Fischer, 
then Foreign Minister of Germany and leading Green figure, vocally supported a European 
government as well as NATO and military action in Afghanistan. As Bomberg notes, ‘These 
internal divisions [were] not new, but EU developments and activity certainly exposed and 
exacerbated them’ (Bomberg 2002: 37).  
Finally, straddling both the new politics cleavage and the traditional left/right class cleavage, 
radical parties of the new left should be lightening rods for internal dissent.
12 As the saying 
goes, ‘politics makes strange bedfellows’. This is certainly true for new left parties which tend 
to be umbrella organisations allying communists – rooted on the extreme left of the class 
cleavage – with ecologists, feminists, civil rights proponents, and anti-war activists – rooted 
on the left-libertarian or gal end of the new politics cleavage.
13 While their communist 
heritage leads them to solidly reject economic integration for reasons already mentioned, the 
diverse preferences of the left-libertarian elements of these parties result in unclear stances 
on the political end. Despite this general ambiguity, however, the dominant tendency is to 
embrace political integration as it minimizes nationalism, promotes broad democratic and 
human rights, and encourages equal treatment of women and minorities. These disparate 
positions on the political and economic aspects of integration make new left parties 
susceptible to internal dissent.  
                                                       
12 In their mapping of a new structural conflict in Western Europe, Kriesi et al. (2006: 925) place both the new left 
and the greens in the upper left-hand corner, indicating their preference for integration on the cultural dimension and 
demarcation on the economic dimension. This placement supports the expectation described here.  
13 Finland’s Left Alliance provides a telling case in point. Based on the core values of freedom, democracy, and 
socially and ecologically sustainable development, the party was founded in 1990 from a merger of the Communist 
Party of Finland (SKP) with the Finnish People’s Democratic League (SKDL) and the Finnish Women’s Democratic 
League (SNDL); its one representative in the European Parliament sits with the United Left/Nordic Green Left 
(GUE/NGL) party group. See http://www.vasemmistoliitto.fi/en_GB/ (accessed 29 July 2007). 
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3. Patterns of Intra-Party Dissent 
Does cleavage theory provide a useful explanation of internal party dissent over European 
integration? If the answer to this question is positive, i.e. if present-day dissent over 
European integration echoes pre-existing tensions, we should observe clear patterns of 
intra-party dissent. First, internal dissent over European integration should remain relatively 
stable over time, with changes coinciding with shifts in the character of the EU. And second, 
party families – reflecting the amalgamation of parties’ historical experiences (including their 
past political divides) – should exhibit predictable patterns of variation in intra-party dissent. 
Cleavage theory implies durability. The ideologies, social institutions, and configurations of 
political contestation stemming from traditional social cleavages may not be frozen, but they 
are also not ephemeral. The influence of such structures persists and continually shapes 
how actors react to new situations and issues. Strategic theories, by contrast, suggest 
change. Identities and positions are more fleeting since they reflect how actors manoeuvre to 
capture votes or to alter the underlying dimensions of competition.  
To measure intra-party dissent over European integration, I employ data from fourteen EU 
member states stemming from three expert surveys carried out in 1996, 1999, and 2002 by 
researches at the University of North Carolina in Chapel Hill.
14 My measure of intra-party 
dissent is based on a question asking country experts to evaluate the overall level of dissent 
within national political parties on European integration. For 1996 and 1999, the question 
utilizes a five-point scale, with the lowest score indicating complete unity and the highest 
score indicating that the majority of activists are opposed to the party leadership. The central 
dissent question in the 2002 survey asks experts to evaluate the overall level of dissent on a 
ten-point scale, ranging from ‘a party is completely united’ (1) to ‘a party is completely 
divided’ (10). For the descriptive section of the empirical analysis, I convert all responses to a 
ten-point scale to facilitate the merger of data from the three time points. The ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression in the later empirical section only incorporates information from 
the 2002 survey. 
On the whole, the data are consistent with a cleavage theory explanation of intra-party 
dissent. Beginning with the time element, internal party dissent displays little variation over 
the 1996-2002 period. I assess stability over time for each party family by treating intra-party 
dissent as a repeated measures variable (since it recurs in 1996, 1999, and 2002) and using 
the general linear model (GLM) procedure to obtain an analysis of variation. The results of 
the analysis suggest stability. None of the tests of within-subject effects are significant, 
                                                       
14 The data are available at http://www.unc.edu/~hooghe/data_pp.php. For exact question wordings and complete 
descriptions of the data sets, see Ray (1999); Steenbergen and Marks (2007). On the utility of using expert survey 
data to measure intra-party dissent, see Edwards 2007. 16 — Erica E. Edwards / Products of Their Past? — I H S 
indicating that intra-party dissent does not change considerably across the three time 
points.
15  
The patterns of party family variation illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 are in line with the 
expectations laid out in the previous section. Figure 1 pools expert survey data from 1996, 
1999, and 2002 and charts the proportion of each party family that experiences high (black), 
medium (grey), and low (white) intra-party dissent. To establish these categories, I determine 
the mean level of internal dissent for all political parties at each time point. I then ascertain 
which parties fall one standard deviation or more below the mean point (low dissent parties), 
one standard deviation or more above the mean point (high dissent parties), and in the 
middle range (medium dissent parties).  
Figure 1: Distribution of parties by intra-party dissent, broken down by party family 
(1996-2002) 
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Sources: Ray (1999); Marks and Steenbergen (2007). N=245. 
 
 
 
                                                       
15 Details are available upon request. 
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Low dissent is unusual. Only 14 percent of the political parties included in the analysis fall 
into this category. Indeed, no party family breaks the 33 percent mark (with the liberals 
coming closest at 29 percent), and two party families – protestant and agrarian – register no 
parties having low dissent. In the post-Maastricht environment of heightened salience and 
greater contestation of EU issues, few parties seem able to escape internal dissent. 
High dissent, by contrast, varies considerably, ranging from no high dissent parties in the 
Christian democratic and regionalist families to 57 percent in the case of the agrarians. Both 
sets of mainstream parties originating in the class cleavage appear prone to dissent, with 30 
percent of conservative parties and 18 percent of social democratic parties classified as 
having high levels of dissent. For conservatives, the historical tension between their national 
and neoliberal doctrines seems to be exacerbated by the difficult decisions they face in the 
economic and political spheres of integration. Similarly, the large percentage of social 
democratic parties marked by dissent is consistent with the notion that market integration 
highlights the endemic socialist trade-off between protecting national social democratic 
achievements and pursuing progressive social policies at the transnational level.  
Party families are not homogeneous groups. The effects of successive cleavages are filtered 
through existing institutions and are powerfully shaped by elite interaction in the formation of 
party systems (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Sartori 1969; Kitschelt 1997). While differences 
among party families allow us to explain a large portion of the variance among individual 
political parties, the power of the cleavage hypothesis is magnified when we peer inside 
party families.  
The graphs below differentiate subsets within the social democratic, conservative, liberal, 
and radical left party families and chart the proportion of each subgroup that displays high 
(black), medium (grey), and low (white) intra-party dissent. The purchase gained by adopting 
this more refined approach is immediately apparent. All four figures are consistent with a 
cleavage explanation of intra-party dissent, with the conservative and radical left party 
families exhibiting sharp differences between subsets and the socialist and liberal party 
families demonstrating milder (though nonetheless significant) differentiation.  
 
 
 
 
 18 — Erica E. Edwards / Products of Their Past? — I H S 
Figure 2: Distribution of parties by intra-party dissent, broken down by party family 
subgroups (1996-2002) 
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Sources: Intra-party dissent over European integration: Ray (1999); Marks and Steenbergen (2007). Party family 
subgroups:  Conservative (N=30): Marks and Wilson (2000: 456). Radical left (N=35): Coding based on core 
ideological tendency of party leadership. For coalition parties or parties formed through mergers, the core tenants 
of each partner are considered. Socialist (N=45): Strength of national social democracy is the combined scores for 
social democratic participation in government, organisational strength of labour, and extent to which resources in a 
society are allocated authoritatively; see Marks and Wilson (2000: 444). Liberal (N=41): Kirchner (1988); Smith 
(1988), and Beyme (1985). 
 
Focusing on the two cases where variation is the starkest, we find that conservative parties 
of a national bent are more likely to display high dissent than their neoliberal counterparts. 
Sixty percent of national conservatives are classified as high dissenters, while no neoliberal 
parties fall into this category. Comparing mean levels of intra-party dissent for the two groups 
is also telling: on a ten-point scale running from lower levels of dissent (1) to higher levels of 
dissent (10), the score of the national conservative parties is 5.9, over two times that of the 
economic conservative grouping. We likewise see sharp differences between subsets of the 
radical left party family. While there are no communist high dissent parties, almost one-third 
of new left parties fit this classification (see Figure 2b). It appears that new left parties such 
as Denmark’s Socialistisk Folkeparti (SF) – rooted in popular socialism and the green 
movement – and Spain’s Izquierda Unida (IU) – founded by a coalition of communist, 
humanist, green, and republican parties – face an uphill, and currently losing, battle bringing 
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together their anti-(economic) integration communist elements and their more pro- (political) 
integration left-libertarian factions. 
Although variation in the socialist party family is less pronounced, Figure 2c shows that high 
dissent parties are more common in countries with legacies of strong social democracy (27 
percent) than in those with weak social democratic traditions (6 percent). The 
Socialdemokratiet i Danmark (SD) and Sweden’s Arbetarepartiet Socialdemokraterna (SAP) 
fall into the former category.
16 Given their roles in establishing strong social democracy at 
home, it has been difficult for these parties to come to terms with a European construct that 
is characterized by negative integration. Though both the SD and the SAP have formally 
endorsed the European project of regulated capitalism, vocal factions within each maintain 
stark opposition (Aylott, 1997, 2002; Lawler, 1997; Sitter, 2001; Lindtröm, 1993; Saglie, 
2000).  
                                                       
16 Note that social democratic dominance has lapsed in both countries recently. The 2001 and 2005 Danish 
elections resulted in coalitions led by the centre-right Venstre (V), and the control of the Swedish SAP ended in 
2006 with the ascendancy of the centre-right Moderata samlingspartiet (M). 20 — Erica E. Edwards / Products of Their Past? — I H S 
4. A Statistical Model of Intra-party Dissent 
Descriptive statistics allow only a limited assessment of the cleavage theory hypothesis. In 
this section, I conduct a more thorough analysis of intra-party dissent over European 
integration by developing an index of cleavage tension. I use this variable to examine the 
central hypothesis that prior conflicts within party families and within individual parties are 
reactivated by the two-pronged nature of European integration (i.e. its economic and political 
dimensions), leading to internal dissent. I test this proposition using 2002 expert survey data 
while controlling for other factors, namely electoral system, occurrence of an EU referendum, 
left/right extremism, government participation, and EU party position. 
To date, rigorous testing of the influence of cleavage structure on the positioning and internal 
dynamics of parties has been negligible. One reason for this is that we lack measures of 
cleavages at the level of political parties. The standard practice is to operationalise political 
cleavages using dummy variables for party families; however, this may mask certain 
nuances integral to the causal story. I address this problem by creating a new measure 
intended to capture cleavage location as it frames orientations on European integration. 
The index of cleavage tension is constructed by plotting ten Western European party families 
(and their subsets) on two scales corresponding to the political and economic dimensions of 
integration. Both scales range from strongly in favour (+2) to strongly opposed (-2), with zero 
representing a neutral point. A party family’s score on each dimension reflects the prior 
cleavage structure as it interacts with the character of European integration to shape the 
party’s position, i.e. the scores reflect cleavage location as it frames positioning on the 
economic and political dimensions of European integration. My expectation is that the 
difference between the economic and political scores creates a tension that is expressed in 
political parties as internal dissent. To capture this tension, I measure the distance between 
a party family’s positions on each of the scales. If a party family crosses the midpoint, i.e. if it 
is moderately or strongly opposed on one dimension and moderately or strongly in favour on 
the other, the family’s score is multiplied by a factor of two. Scoring for the index is derived 
primarily from estimates in Marks and Wilson (2000: 445, 450, 453, 456) and Marks et al. 
(2002: 587), supplemented by additional secondary sources (see Table 1).
17
Table 1 provides summary scores of the index of cleavage tension for the various party 
families and their subsets.
                                                       
17 An alternative specification of the cleavage theory hypothesis is to use party family dummies. Such an analysis 
yields results similar to those presented here (see Edwards 2007). 
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Table 1: Summary scores of index of cleavage tension 
Party Family 
  
Cleavage Location  Position on European 
Economic Integration 
Position on European 
Political Integration 
Secondary Sources°  Index of 
Cleavage 
Tension 
Radical left         
communist  Class cleavage: extreme left 
on state regulation of 
markets, welfare, social 
justice, democratic decision 
making.  
 
Moderately opposed: 
supranational institutions are 
inherently undemocratic and 
controlled by corporate 
interests. (-1) 
 
1 
new left  New politics cleavage: 
extreme left in some 
countries; environmental 
protection, life-style choice, 
women's and minority rights. 
Strongly opposed: integration 
increases economic inequality 
and decreases the capacity of 
national governments to 
regulate markets. (-2) 
Moderately in favour: 
supranational institutions may 
enforce environmental and 
social standards, but 
democracy is weakened. (+1) 
Middlemas 1980; Christensen 
1996; Kitschelt 1994; Waller & 
Fennema 1988; Timmermann 
1987 
 
6 
Social democratic       
strong national 
social democracy 
Moderately opposed: 
integration boosts regime 
competition and thereby 
constrains welfare and other 
government regulation. (-1) 
6 
weak national 
social democracy 
Class cleavage: moderate left 
position on state regulation of 
markets, welfare, economic 
equality. 
Moderately in favour: 
integration increases economic 
growth. (+1) 
 
Strongly in favour: 
supranational institutions 
improve capacity for European-
wide regulation, though they are 
insufficiently democratic. (+2) 
Butler 1995; Featherstone 
1986, 1888; Gillespie 1993; 
Giddens 1998; Kitschelt 1994; 
Ladrech 1993, 1997, 2000; 
Ladrech & Marlière 1999; 
Notermans 2001; Paterson 
1974; Paterson & Thomas 
1986; Padgett and Paterson 
1991; Piven 1992; Roder 2003; 
Scharpf 1991, 1999; Wilde 
1994; Aylott 1999a, 1999b; 
Geyer 1997; Haahr 1993 
1 
Green New politics cleavage: 
environmental protection, life-
style choice, women's and 
minority rights. 
Moderately opposed: 
integration increases economic 
growth but at the expense of 
human concerns, including the 
environment. (-1) 
Moderately in favour: 
supranational institutions may 
enforce environmental and 
social standards, but 
democracy is weakened. (+2) 
Knapp 2004; Kitschelt 1989; 
Taggart 1996; Hainsworth 1990; 
Rüdig 1990; Kemp & Wall 1990; 
Burchell 2001; Doherty 1992, 
2002; Müller-Rommel 1989; 
O'Neill 1997; Bomberg 1998; 
Carter 2001; Bomberg & Carter 
2006 
4 
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Party Family 
  
Cleavage Location  Position on European 
Economic Integration 
Position on European 
Political Integration 
Secondary Sources°  Index of 
Cleavage 
Tension 
Liberal       
conservative/ 
economic  
Neutral: limited supranational 
authority is necessary to 
facilitate free markets; however, 
oppose re-regulation at 
European level. (0) 
4 
radical/political 
Centre/periphery cleavage 
(UK, Germany); church/state 
cleavage (Low Countries, 
France, Italy, Spain): 
opposition to ascription, 
clericalism, and aristocracy, 
and support for economic 
and political freedoms. 
Strongly in favour: integration 
enhances market competition 
and economic freedoms. (+2) 
Strongly in favour: 
supranationalism moderates 
nationalism; political freedom 
from borders increased; 
however, democracy is 
weakened. (+2) 
Beyme 1985; Salvadori 1977; 
Smith 1988; Bille & Pedersen 
2004; Kirchner 1988; Benedetto 
& Quaglia 2007; Callot 1988; 
Guiat 2003 
 
0 
Conservative       
economic   Neutral: limited supranational 
authority is necessary to 
facilitate free markets. (0) 
4 
national  
Class cleavage: support for 
free markets, minimal state 
intervention, and defence of 
national community. 
Strongly in favour: integration 
extends free markets and 
pressures competing national 
governments to reduce market 
regulation. (+2) 
Strongly opposed: 
supranational authority 
undermines national 
sovereignty, national culture, 
and democracy. (-2) 
Layton-Henry 1980, 1982; 
Girvin 1988; Baker et al 1993, 
1994, 1997, 1999; Demker 
1997; Harmel & Svasand 1997; 
Evans 1998; Garry 1995; Norris 
& Lovenduski 2004; Alexandre 
& Jardin 1997; Hainsworth 
1999; Sowemimo 1996; 
Whiteley 1994; Whiteley et al 
1999; Whiteley & Seyd 1999; 
Knapp & Le Gales 1993  
8 
Christian 
democratic 
Church/state cleavage: 
support for social market 
economy, supranational 
Catholic church, conservative 
values. 
Strongly in favour: integration 
increases economic growth and 
limits division within Europe. 
(+2) 
Strongly in favour: 
supranational institutions 
provide a capacity for positive 
regulation while constraining 
nationalism. (+2) 
Durand 1997; Gerard & Hecke 
2004; Hanley 1994; Irving 1979; 
Kalyvas 1996; Lamberts 1997; 
van Kersbergen 1994; van 
Hecke 2004 
0 
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Party Family 
  
Cleavage Location  Position on European 
Economic Integration 
Position on European 
Political Integration 
Secondary Sources°  Index of 
Cleavage 
Tension 
Protestant  Church/state cleavage: 
fundamentalist Lutheran 
opposition to liberalism, 
permissiveness, and central 
state elites. 
Moderately in favour: 
integration weakens the role of 
the state in the economy. (+1) 
Strongly opposed: integration 
shifts authority further away 
from national control to a more 
alien cultural milieu. (-2) 
Valen & Rokkan 1974; 
Karvonen 1994; Madeley 1994, 
2004 
 
6 
Agrarian  Centre/periphery cleavage 
(Scandinavia, Switzerland): 
defence of farmers and the 
periphery. 
Moderately in favour: 
integration is driven mainly by 
industrial and commercial 
interests but includes 
agriculture subsidies and may 
entail economic benefits. (+1) 
Moderately opposed: shifts 
authority further away from local 
control to a more alien cultural 
milieu. (-1) 
Christensen 1997; Elder & 
Gooderham 1978; Urwin 1980; 
Arter 2001; Sundberg 1999; 
Batory & Sitter 2004  
 
4 
Regionalist  Centre/periphery cleavage: 
defence of the ethno-
territorial minority against the 
centre and demand for 
political autonomy. 
Strongly in favour: integration 
provides an economic 
framework favourable for 
regional political autonomy. (+2) 
Moderately in favour: 
supranational authority 
weakens national control and 
creates a plural Europe. (+1) 
Nielsen 1980; Lancaster 1989; 
Berger 1977; Cinnirella 2000; 
Crowley 2000; Dardanelli 2005; 
de Winter & Türsan 1998; 
Gallagher 1991; Scheinman 
1999, De Winter & Cachafeiro 
2002; Jolly 2007  
1 
Radical right  New politics cleavage: 
defence of the nation, 
national culture, and national 
sovereignty. 
Neutral: integration produces 
losses and undermines national 
economic control. (0) 
Strongly opposed: 
supranational authority 
undermines national 
sovereignty. (-2) 
Betz 1984, 1993; Ignazi 1992, 
2003; Harris 1994; Poguntke 
1993; Fieschi et al 1996; 
Kitschelt 1997; Carter 2005; 
Knapp 2004; Givens 2005; 
Mudde 2000; Cole 2005 
4 
 
Notes: This table modifies and extends Marks et al. (2002: 587). Position on European economic/political integration measured on a four-point scale ranging from strongly in 
favor (+2) to strongly opposed (-2), with 0 representing a neutral point. Index of cleavage tension is the distance between a party family’s positions on the European 
economic/political integration scales. If a party family crosses the midpoint, i.e. if it is moderately or strongly opposed on one dimension and moderately or strongly in favor on 
the other, the score is multiplied by two, e.g. the index of cleavage tension for national conservatives = 8 [4 (distance) * 2 (crosses midpoint)]. °Full citations of the secondary 
sources are not included in the list of references (due to word restrictions) but are available upon request. 
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In addition to the main variable of interest, I incorporate a number of controls to account for 
national and individual party characteristics. At the national level, I control for type of 
electoral system and the occurrence (at any point) of a referendum on European integration. 
Research on parliamentary unity suggests that the institutional setting can have a significant 
bearing on the internal divisiveness of political parties (Katz 1980; Boueck 2002; Harmel and 
Janda 1982; Bowler et al. 1999). In particular, parties competing in plurality systems tend to 
be more internally divided that those competing in proportional representation (PR) systems. 
There is also good reason to believe that political parties from countries that have held 
referendums on European integration may be more prone to internal dissent. National 
referendums take contestation out of the hands of parties and deliver it to citizens who cast 
votes not for political parties, but for (or often against) a particular issue (Leduc 2002; de 
Vreese 2006; Hobolt 2006). Consequently, they tend to be ‘flash points’ for the politicisation 
of EU issues (Hooghe and Marks 2009: 20; also see De Vries 2009) and often lead to party 
disunity.  
At the individual party level, I include controls for left/right extremism,  government 
participation, and EU position. Scholars have shown that peripheral parties that are 
marginalized on the main left/right axis of contention look for secondary issues (e.g. the EU) 
on which to compete (Riker 1982; Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989), a strategy that should 
only work if the party is relatively united on the issue. Taking into consideration Taggart’s 
observation that intra-party conflict on the EU ‘seems to be the almost exclusive preserve of 
governmental parties’ (1998: 372), I also include a variable measuring the length of time a 
party has spent in office. Finally, I control for a party’s EU position anticipating that pro-
integrationist parties will be more united on EU issues than their more Eurosceptic 
counterparts. Appendix A summarizes the indicators used in the analysis. 
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Table 2: Analysis of intra-party dissent over European integration 
Independent Variables  Unstandardized 
Coefficients (b) 
Robust Standard 
Errors 
Index of cleavage tension   0.230*  0.047 
Electoral system    0.106  0.169 
Referendum   0.070  0.124 
Left/right extremism    -0.168  0.277 
Government participation    0.004*  0.001 
Position   -0.477*  0.129 
Constant   5.204*  0.824 
R
2  0.510   
N    85  
Notes: Table entries are OLS estimates with robust, cluster-corrected 
standard errors. All party-level variables have been weighted by vote size. 
*p<0.01 (two-tailed). 
 
The OLS regression results presented in Table 2 confirm the cleavage hypothesis. The 
coefficient for the index of cleavage tension is positive and statistically significant. Moreover, 
computing the predicted probabilities reveals that cleavage tension has a large substantive 
effect: intra-party dissent increases by 18 percent when the strength of the cleavage tension 
variable moves from its minimum (1) to its maximum (8) value.
18 These results suggest that 
current schisms within political parties over European integration are largely manifestations 
of entrenched, pre-existing hostilities. Internal divisions on EU issues arise when parties are 
unable to reconcile the two streams – economic and political – of European integration. The 
findings presented in Table 2 indicate that a political party’s ability to successfully square 
these two, often competing, aspects of the European project depends on the party’s past 
experiences. 
                                                       
18 The predicted probabilities are calculated using CLARIFY (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003). 
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Conclusion 
For much of the EU’s history, political parties have avoided politicising integration for fear of 
provoking internal conflict (Ray 1997; van der Eijk and Franklin 1996; Steenbergen and Scott 
2004; Hooghe and Marks 2009: 19). Research has shown that this apprehension is well 
founded. Disunity stymies the ability of political parties to strategically manipulate EU issue 
salience (Scott 2001; Steenbergen and Scott 2004; Netjes and Binnema 2007), hampers 
effective partisan cueing (Ray 2003; Steenbergen et al. 2007; Gabel and Scheve 2007), 
diminishes electoral popularity (e.g. Evans 1998; Ferrara and Weishaupt 2004), and at its 
extreme can be the death knell of a political party. But as Hooghe and Marks note: ‘With the 
Maastricht Accord of 1991, decision-making on European integration entered the contentious 
world of party competition, elections, and referendums’ (2009: 7). In other words, conflict 
over the EU is inescapable in Europe’s existing political environment, and it appears that for 
many political parties so, too, is internal dissent.  
Returning to the question posed at the outset, which political parties are most vulnerable to 
divisive pressures? This article has argued that an answer to this question can be found by 
applying Lipset and Rokkan’s theory of social cleavages. The central thesis posited here is 
that current rifts within political parties reflect deep-seated tensions rekindled by the dual 
nature European integration. Consequently, to understand current divides over Europe, such 
as that faced by France’s Parti Socialiste, we must turn to their distinctive historical legacies 
rooted in societal cleavages.  
The empirical results presented in this article lend credence to this assertion. Data from 
expert surveys on party positioning on European integration reveal that intra-party dissent 
displays stability over time, yet varies in an explicable way across and within party families. 
Political parties are products of their past, profoundly shaped by their enduring ideological 
tendencies, long-standing constituency ties, programmatic commitments, and, from a longer 
historical perspective, by prior crises and upheavals. Embedded historical experience 
provides a key not only to the positions that political parties take on Europe, but also to the 
extent to which European issues engender conflict within parties. The findings of this article 
add to the body of literature on cleavage theory and party positioning, bolstering the notion 
that historical predispositions rooted in political cleavages provide ‘”prism[s]” through which 
political parties come to terms with new issues that arise in a polity’ (Marks and Wilson 2001: 
459). By focusing on internal party dissent, this study addresses a fundamental lacuna in the 
literature on party politics. 
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Appendix A: Variable Description 
Variables Description 
Intra-party dissent  Degree of dissent within a party on European 
integration as measured using the following expert 
survey items: For 1984-99, ‘[What is] the degree of 
dissent within the party over the party leadership’s 
position?’ (1=complete unity; 5=leadership position 
opposed by a majority of party activists). For 2002, 
‘How much internal dissent has there been in the 
various parties in [COUNTRY] over European 
integration over the course of 2002?’ (1=party is 
completely united; 10=party is extremely divided). 
To facilitate comparison over time, all responses are 
converted to a 10-point scale with lower scores 
indicating minor dissent and higher scores 
representing major dissent. Sources: Ray (1999), 
Marks and Steenbergen (2007). 
Index of cleavage tension  A variable capturing the historical experiences or 
programmatic commitments of political parties. 0=no 
tension; 8=extreme tension. Sources: See Table 1. 
Electoral system  A dummy variable indicating the type of electoral 
system a country employs. 1=proportional 
representation (PR with or without thresholds, 
mixed member PR, Greece’s reinforced PR), 
0=plurality/majority (first-past-the-post, single 
transferable vote, France’s two round system)  
Referendum  A dummy variable indicating that a country has held 
a referendum on and EU issue. 1=referendum; 
0=no referendum. 
Left/right extremism  A dummy variable indicating that a party is one 
standard deviation above or below the mean 
left/right ideological position of all parties in a given 
year. Sources: Ray (1999), Marks and Steenbergen 
(2007). 
Government participation  Cumulative months a political party has been in 
government since 1980. 
EU position  EU position as measured using the following item: 
“[What is] the overall orientation of the party 
leadership toward European integration?” 
(1=strongly opposed to integration; 7=strongly in 
favour of integration). This variable was centred on 
the mean. Sources: Ray (1999), Marks and 
Steenbergen (2007). 
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